



# Air Mobility Trajectory Anomaly Detection and Operational Advancement

David Sacharny, Thomas C. Henderson,  
and Xiaoyue Cathy Liu

# Advanced Air Mobility

How do we automate air traffic control  
for autonomous aircraft?

***UAS Traffic Management (UTM)***

for

***Advanced Air Mobility (AAM)***

A problem for government agencies  
such as *NASA*, the *FAA*, and  
*Departments of Transportation (DOT)*



# Project Goals

1. The impact of configurations of virtual highways (lanes)
2. The impact of tactical contingency response on the lane system
3. An investigation into trajectory anomaly detection within the lane-based approach.

# NASA's Advanced Air Mobility National Campaign

## Advanced Air Mobility National Campaign Partners



Advanced Air Mobility, with its many vehicle concepts and potential uses in both local and intraregional applications, is shown in this illustration.

To integrate air taxis, cargo delivery aircraft, and other new vehicle concepts into the National Airspace System, NASA's Advanced Air Mobility (AAM) National Campaign needs to partner with industry, state government, and other government agencies to be successful.

The team also is closely working with the Federal Aviation Administration to provide testing data and determine which current aviation standards need to evolve. The ongoing effort aims to help integrate new aircraft into the skies.

## Developmental Test partners (NC-DT)

The developmental testing phase ended in 2021 after flights with Joby's air taxi vehicle. These activities were designed to allow aircraft and airspace management service providers to demonstrate their systems with real-world operations and in simulated situations. The goal of DT was to prepare for NC-1, which is slated to occur in 2022.

**Developmental Flight Testing** - Industry partner provided a vehicle to fly in the NC-DT and demonstrated key integrated operational Urban Air Mobility or UAM scenarios.




- Joby Aviation of Santa Cruz, California

**Developmental Airspace Simulation** - Industry partner tested its UAM traffic management services in NASA-designed airspace simulations and demonstrated key integrated operational UAM scenarios.

- AirMap, Inc. of Santa Monica, California
- AiRXOS, Part of GE Aviation, of Boston, Massachusetts
- ANRA Technologies, Inc. of Chantilly, Virginia
- ARINC Inc. of Cedar Rapids, Iowa
- Avison, Inc. of Santa Monica, California
- Ellis & Associates, Los Angeles, CA, a wholly-owned subsidiary of Lacuna Technologies, Palo Alto, CA
- **GeoRq LLC of Holladay, Utah**
- Metron Aviation, Inc. of Herndon, Virginia
- OneSky Systems Inc. of Exton, Pennsylvania
- Uber Technologies, Inc. of San Francisco, California


# Strategic Deconfliction

*The FAA/NASA method (and the current standard)*




# Strategic Deconfliction

*The FAA/NASA method (and the current standard)*



# Solution


**Airspace Structures**  
that support  
**Dense Operations**  
and  
**Efficient Strategic**  
**Deconfliction**



# Inspiration

## Working Group Meetings with UDOT Aeronautics




- Raised questions about airspace capacity and infrastructure
- Desire to restrict operations over private property
- Dual-Altitude airspace design discussed







# Addressed by the Lane-Based Approach

## FAA/NASA





## Lane-Based



# What are Lanes?

Lanes are edges in a directed graph

- Not restricted to straight lines
- Disjoint lanes separated by minimum distance
- Either the in-degree or out-degree of every vertex is less than two.





# Strategic Deconfliction

## *The Lane-Based Approach*



The basics:

1. Choose a path through the system (Dijkstra, A\*, etc.)
2. Request a launch time





# Constructing Lanes

## *The Lane-Based Approach*



# Constructing Lanes

## *The Lane-Based Approach*




Recommended maximum entry design speeds for roundabouts at various intersection site categories are provided in Exhibit 6-4.

Site Category	Recommended Maximum Entry Design Speed
Mini-Roundabout	25 km/h (15 mph)
Urban Compact	25 km/h (15 mph)
Urban Single Lane	35 km/h (20 mph)
Urban Double Lane	40 km/h (25 mph)
Rural Single Lane	40 km/h (25 mph)
Rural Double Lane	50 km/h (30 mph)




# Constructing Lanes

## *Two-Altitude Lanes over San Francisco*




# Constructing Lanes

## *Single-Altitude Lane System*




# Constructing Lanes

## *Lane System in Dubai*






# Lane-Based Approach over Salt Lake







# STRUCTURE AND COMPARISON

Tools for Analyzing Lane Systems and  
Comparisons to the Current Approach






# Spatial Network Measures

The lane-based approach supports a static analysis through spatial network measures more commonly used to describe ground transportation systems.




# Spatial Network Measures

The lane-based approach supports a static analysis through spatial network measures more commonly used to describe ground transportation systems.




# How is UTM Behavior Measured?

- Failed Flights
  - Number of flights that desire a schedule but are denied due to space/time/safety constraints
  
- Delay
  - How much time between when a vehicle wants to launch and when it is allowed to launch
  
- Deconfliction Time
  - How much time is required to plan a trajectory




# UTM Comparison

27 combinations of UTM parameters tested, 10 simulation runs each, 4 hour sim time




# UTM Comparison

Failed flights count operations that could not be scheduled



# UTM Comparison


## Mean delay





# UTM Comparison

Mean Deconfliction Time (wall clock)





# UTM Comparison

Low flex, low speed, high headway → more failed flights (less airspace capacity)

- FAA and SF most sensitive
- Many SF choke points (high betweenness centrality)

Structured airspace deconfliction time lower on average





# CONTINGENCIES

UAS Behaviors and UTM Policies

# Contingencies

## UTM Policies (CPAD)

### Algorithm 1: Closest Point of Approach

- 1  $\forall$  active flight,  $f$
- 2 **if**  $f$  enters a new lane
- 3     **OR** a neighboring flight has slowed
- 4     **OR**  $f$  has reduced speed on its own
- 5 **then** call `Deconflict_Pair` for all flights in neighboring lanes
- 6 **if**  $f$  has reduced speed
- 7 **then**  $f$  broadcasts this information.

#### *Deconflict\_Pair*

- while** `conflict( $f_1, f_2$ )`
- reduce speed,  $s_1$ , of  $f_1$
- if**  $s_1 < s_{min}$
- then** flight  $f_1$  fails

Table 1: Delays and Failures in Experimental Simulations


$t_{max}$	$n_f$	$s_{max}$	Wait	Fly	Done	Fail	Avg Speed	Delays
100	100	5	1	18	81	0	4.98	2
			2	12	86	0	4.98	2
			0	15	85	0	4.99	1
			0	11	89	0	4.98	2
			1	18	81	0	4.96	4
means			0.8	14.8	84.4	0	4.98	2.2
100	100	9	0	11	89	0	8.98	1
			1	8	91	0	8.94	2
			0	12	88	0	8.99	0
			0	6	94	0	8.99	0
			0	11	88	1	8.98	0
means			0.2	9.6	90	0.2	8.98	0.6
200	200	5	0	14	186	0	4.96	6
			0	11	189	0	4.97	8
			0	17	183	0	4.98	6
			1	13	186	0	4.99	10
			0	6	194	0	4.96	9
means			0.2	12.2	187.6	0	4.97	8.6
200	200	9	0	7	193	0	8.96	4
			1	6	193	0	8.97	2
			0	8	192	0	8.97	4
			0	7	193	0	8.98	3
			0	4	196	0	8.97	2
means			0.2	6.4	193.4	0	8.97	3

# MONITORING THE AIRSPACE


Detecting Anomalies and Rogue Aircraft



# Lane-Based Trajectory Model



Lane Point Samples




Lane Direction Samples





# Detecting Anomalies

## Nominal vs. Anomalous Behavior or (NAB)

- A system for detecting, tracking, and characterizing airspace traffic
- Can detect rogue, hobbyist, and conforming aircraft
- Output can be fed into neural nets for further classification



# Nominal Trajectory Behavior





# Anomalous Trajectory Behavior


**Hobbyist Type I:** Flies up from one place and makes a few moves above the launch site, then eventually lands at the same site.

**Hobbyist Type II:** Flies up from one place and makes a few moves above the launch site, hovers after each move, then eventually lands at the launch site. –



**Hobbyist Type III:** Flies up in a circular motion to some highest point then flies down in a circular motion to land.

**Rogue Type I:** Flies up over and down as for a delivery.

**Rogue Type II:** Flies up to a lane, flies along the lane to the end, then flies to another lane (not necessarily connected), and eventually flies down to land.





# Anomalous Trajectory Behavior




# Classifying Anomalies

Simple feed-forward network classification of nominal/anomalous



# Cyber Security




# The Attack Landscape

		Attacked Asset	
		Physical	Cyber
Attack Type	Physical	<i>Physical Attacks</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Sabotage of infrastructure</li> <li>- Physical weapons to disable UAS</li> <li>- Coercion of authorized persons</li> </ul>	<i>Cyber-Physical Attacks</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Radio signal jamming</li> <li>- Compromising unattended sensors</li> <li>keys EM radiation-based attack on security</li> </ul>
	Cyber	<i>Cyber-Physical Threats</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- ADS-B/GNSS spoofing</li> <li>- Sensor data manipulation</li> <li>- Telemetry data/link manipulation</li> </ul>	<i>Cyber Attacks</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Malware insertion</li> <li>- Network traffic analysis</li> <li>- Data theft and corruption</li> <li>- Identification spoofing</li> <li>- Cryptanalysis</li> </ul>

# The Attack Landscape

Likelihood Level	Quantification of Likelihood
Extremely Improbably	Zero-day exploit available; multi-lateral staged attack; +\$10M in cost
Improbable	\$1M-\$10M in cost; complex mission planning with staff; bot herder, fleet of bots
Remote	Multi-thousand to millions of dollars in cost; sophisticated malware, ransomware, phishing, etc.
Occasional	Unsophisticated malware
Frequent	Low cost or free; pay-for-hire

# Conclusion



# Conclusion

Is the system for managing UAMs moving in this direction?

Airspace Structure Definition Service (ASDS)!



# Continuing/Future Work


Utah Advanced Air Mobility Simulator  
(UAAMS)

AFWERX Phase II

- Multi-Domain Deconfliction
- Department of Defense Applications

Continuing Research

- Incorporating Vehicle Models
- More Contingency Modeling



Thank You